




The treaty-making power is the power which determines
the relations of a nation with other nations and of the subjects
of one State with the subjects of another, and is thus one of
the most important of the powers of government. This power
is usually vested in the executive department of government,
under limitations which vary in different nations.
In Great Britain the power is lodged in the Crown, and a
treaty made by the sovereign is valid without the authority or
sanction of Parliament. But when a treaty involves either a
charge on the people or a change in the law of the land, while
it can be made by the Crown alone, it cannot be carried into
effect without the sanction of Parliament. It is usual to make
such treaties subject to the approval of Parliament, and to
submit them for its approval before ratification, or to ratify them
conditionally. The doctrine has been recently advanced that
in England the sovereign has no power in time of peace to cede
territory by treaty to a foreign power without the approval of
Parliament. In 1890 when the Queen was about to conclude
a treaty with the Emperor of Germany for the cession of
Ileligoland she was advised by her ministers to make the
cession conditional upon the approval of Parliament, the theory
being that the sovereign could not make such a treaty without
the sanction of Parliament. This was much criticised in
debate. Mr. Gladstone, at that time out of power, did not
consider the authority of Parliament at all essential. "it is
hardly possible," he said, "I believe, to conceive any kind of
(243)
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territory-colonies acquired by conquest, colonies acquired by
settlement, with representative institutions or without repre-
sentative institutions-it is not possible to point out any class
of territory where you cannot show cases of cession by the
Crown without the authority of Parliament." Anson writing
on the Law and Customs of the Constitution, in commenting
on this, seems to be of the opinion that to make the ratification
depend on the good will of Parliament is an abnegation on the
part of the Executive of a responsibility which the ministers
ought to be ready to assume on behalf of the Crown. 1  The
fact that the English sovereign in conducting negotiations with
foreign powers is exempt from the direct control or supervision
of Parliament, certainly gives the monarch an opportunity for
exercising great influence on the conduct of aflairs 2
In Switzerland the Federal Constitution confers on the con-
federation the sole right of concluding treaties with foreign
powers, " particularly treaties relating to tariffs and commerce,"
while at the same time reserving to the cantons the right to
conclude treaties with foreign powers " respecting the adminis-
tration of public property and border and police intercourse."
The Federal Council, which constitutes the Executive of Swit-
zerland and is composed of seven members, is entrusted gener-
ally with all that concerns foreign relations. The member of
the Council who is at the head of the Department of Foreign
Affairs is charged with the work preparatory to the negotiation
of treaties, and treaties prepared by him must be submitted by
him to the Council, and, if approved by a majority of its mem-
bers, they are then submitted to the two houses, which together
constitute the Federal Assembly. These two houses are known
as the National Council and the Council of States, the former
representing the people, and the latter the cantons, answering
in this respect to our House and Senate. These two chambers
are entrusted with the ratification of alliances and treaties with.
I Part It, p. 281.
2 Dicey's Law of the Constitution.
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foreign powers. They have the power to request the Federal
Council to adopt a particular foreign policy, but in every case
the treaty must come from the Council to the Chambers, and
receive the approval of these two bodies.
The treaty-making power, under the present Constitution of.
the French Republic, is lodged in the President, subject in
certain cases to the approval of the two Chambers. The pro-
vision is as follows:
"The President of the Republic negotiates and ratifies
treaties. As soon ais the interest and safety of the State shall
permit, lie shall give information of their contents to the
Chambers. Treaties of peace, of commerce, treaties which
involve the finances of the State, those which refer to the
condition of persons, and to the rights of" property of French-
men in foreign countries, are not final until voted by the two
Chambers. No cession, no exchange, no annexation of' territory
can take place except by virtue of law."
This is a more limited power than lie possessed under" the
Constitution of 1852, in which it was simply declared that the
President of the Republic " makes treaties of peace, of alliance,
and commerce." Under the Constitution of 1848, it is provided
that the President "negotiates and ratifies treaties. No treaty
is definitive until it has been approved by the National Assem-
bly." Another clause declares that he " cannot cede any
portion of the territory." The Constitution of 1880 simply
provides that the King " makes treaties of peace, alliance and
commerce," being similar to the provision in the Constitution
of 1814.
The Constitution of the German Empire gives the Emperor
the power to make treaties, but it also provides that in so far as
treaties relate to subjects which fill within the legislative
power of the Empire the Bundesrath shall concur in forming
them, and that in such cases they shall not take effect until
ratified by the Reich.stag.
The Articles of Confederation gave to the United States " in
Congress assembled" the sole and exclusive right and power
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of entering into treaties. The Articles also provided that the
United States should never enter into any treaties or alliances
" unless nine States assent to the same" (through their repre-
sentatives in the Congress). The power thus conferred was
exercised in a number of instances, the most notable being the
negotiation of the Treaty of Peace of 1783. The difficulty
under the Articles was that while Congress had the power to
make treaties it was without power to enforce them. It was
compelled to look on in silent submission and see its treaties
violated by the States in whose interest they were made. It
could do no more than advise, suggest and recommend to the
States, and generally its advice, suggestions and recommenda-
tions were ignored. The Treaty of Peace, for example, pro-
vided that creditors on either side should meet with no lawful
impediment to the recovery of their debts. Under the present
Constitution, making a treaty the supreme law of the land.
this provision of the Treaty would have annulled all State laws
imposing impediments to the collection of the debts, and creditors
could have proceeded for their recovery without reference to
anything to the contrary which might have been contained in
the constitutions or laws of the several States. But under the
Articles it was not so. The Treaty did not operate as a repeal
of State laws, and Congress could only remonstrate with the
States and entreat them to conform their laws to the provisions
of the Treaty. A nation making treaties which it is unable
to compel even its own people to observe, cannot occupy a
very dignified position among nations, and is not in a position
where it can command much respect. There can be little
inducement to negotiate a treaty under such circumstances.
The Constitution of the United States provides that the
President "shall have power, by and with the advice ard
consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of
the Senators present concur." In the plan proposed to the
Constitutional Convention by Mr. Charles Pinckney, of South
Carolina, on May 29th, 1787, it was provided that " The Senate
shall have the sole and exclusive power * * * to make
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treaties." In the plan proposed by Alexander Hamilton on
June 18th, he provided that the Executive should '" have, with
the advice and approbation of the Senate, the power of making
all treaties." 2  In the report of the Committee of Detail,
made by Mr. Rutledge on August 6th, it was stated: " The
Senate of the United States shall have power to make treaties." -
On August 15tb, the matter was under discussion in the Con-
vention, and Mr. Mercer contended that the Senate ought not
to have the treaty-making power as it belonged to the Execu-
tive department. le was also of the opinion that treaties
should not go into effect until ratified "by legislative authority." 4
Mr. Mason claimed that the power should not reside in the
Senate as it might by treaty dismember the Union by alien-
ating territory.5  Later, Mr. Madison announced himself as
thinking "it proper that the President should be an agent
in treaties." 6  On August 31st, a committee, consisting of a
member from each State, wis created to whom was referred
such parts of the Constitution as had been postponed or not
acted on. That committee reported, September 4th, the fol-
lowing : " The President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, shall have power to make treaties. * * * *
But no treaty shall be made without the consent of two-thirds
of the members present." 7  On September 7th, the question
came up again, and it was proposed to insert after the word
"Senate " the words "and House of Representatives." It was
thought that the necessity of secrecy forbade a reference to the
House, and the proposal was rejected, Pennsylvania alone
voting in its favor.8 The provision as reported above on Sep-
tember 4th, was then adopted, and on September 12th the Com-
'Madison Papers, Vol. 2, p. 742.
'Madison Papers, Vol. 2, p. 891.
3Madison Papers, Vol. 2, p. 1234.
4Madison Papers, Vol. 3. p. 1331.
5 Madison Papers, Vol. 3, p. 1331, 1332.
6Madison Papers, Vol. 3, p. 1412.
7Madison Papers, Vol. 3, p. 1487.
SMadison Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 1518, 1519.
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mittee on Style reported the provision as we now find it in the
Constitution. It was not thought wise to entrust the treaty-
making power to the President alone, as is sometimes done in
the case of an hereditary monarch, lest he might be corrupted
by foreign powers. It was therefore necessary to associate some
other body with him in the exercise of this power, and the
Senate was preferred fbr this purpose to the House, because of
the greater experience and more comprehensive knowledge of
foreign affairs which was likely to characterize its members,
as well as on account of its smaller membership. It was
thought that a body more numerous than the Senate was likely
to become would be very little fit for the proper discharge of
the trust. Two-thirds of the Senators present were required
to concur in the ratification of the treaty rather than two-
thirds of the whole body, for the reason that if the latter prin-
ciple had been adopted it would often, from the non-attendance
of some, amount in practice to a necessity of unanimity.
But the Constitution contains another important provision
on the subject. It declares that "all treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the authority of the United States shall
be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of
any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Ordinarily a
treaty is not a law, but simply a contract between sovereigns.
The above provision of the Constitution, however, makes the
treaties of the United States a part of the municipal law.
This is a peculiarity of out Constitution for special and local
reasons. The treaty-making power of the United States, under
this provision, may negotiate a treaty which will, if constitu-
tionally concluded and ratified, abrogate:
1. A provision in the Constitution of any one of the States
which conflicts with the provisions of the treaty.
2. A provision in the statute law of any State contrary to
the treaty.
'See Federalist, Number 75.
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3. A pre-existing federar statute inconsistent therewith, in
:accordance with the maxim, leqes posteriores priores contrarias
abrogant.
Because, in the absence of such a provision as that we are
considering, a treaty is a mere contract and not a legislative
-act, it does not generally itself effect the object to be accom-
plished, but must be supplemented by aiction taken by the
Lw-making body. But in this country a treaty is for manypurposes equivalent to an act of Congress, and may alone effect
the object it seeks to accomplish. In the United States the
treaty-making power under the Constitution is more plenary
than it was under the Articles of Confederation. The Articles,
although conferring on Congress the sole and exclusive right of
entering into treaties, limited the power by providing "that no
treaty of commerce shall be made, whereby the legislative
power of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing
such imposts and duties on foreigners as their own people are
subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation
of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever."1
But under the Constitution the power to make treaties is
conferred in general terms. There are no limitations expressed
in the instrument, and it is fiair to assume that the power exists
in the national government as fully and completely as it exists
anywhere. As no part of it is reserved by the Constitution to
the States the whole is in the federal government. But does it
exist in the national government without any limitations, and
what are the limitations if any there be? Limitations may be
implied even when none are expressed, and that such exist in
respect to the treaty-making power we cannot doubt. Madison
declares that a treaty is the supreme law of the land provided
it be within the prerogative of making treaties, " which, no
doubt, has certain limits."' 2  Hamilton writes Washington,
July 9th, 1795, that " A treaty cannot be made which alters
I Articles of Confederaion, Art. 9.
'Madison's Writings, Vol. I, p. 524.
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the Constitution of the country, or'which infringes any express
exceptions to the power of the Constitution of the United
States. But it is difficult to assign any other bounds to the
power."' The matter has been nowhere better put than by
Judge Cooley, who recently has expressed it as follows:
But though no limitations are laid upon the power in the
National Constitution. some exist in the very nature of things
which the treaty-making power must be expected under all
circumstances to respect and observe. We say this, having in
mind only what we suppose to be a general rule applicable
whenever the extent of the treaty-making authority of any
country comes in question ; all the conditions under which it
has come into existence are to be considered: the racial and
other peculiarities of the people ; what the country is and its
situation ; the nature of established institutions, and so on, fbr
all these are in mind when the authority is created, and in
some sense are of its substance, whatever may be the words
under which it is expressed. * * * * Then the treaty-
making power, whatever be the nature of the government,
if to be exercised by any subordinate of the sovereign and not
by the sovereign directly, must not set aside or disregard any
authoritative expression of the sovereign will, and it must not
do acts or enter into negotiations that tend to undermine
or overturn any existing institution of the country, or to change
in any particular the established government. * * * *
When a treaty is said to be the supreme law, it is nevertheless
to be understood that the Constitution, which is the highest
expression of sovereign will and the authoritative representa-
tive of sovereign power in the nation, in fixing limitations
upon the exercise of authority under it in regard to the sub-
jects above indicated and many others, restrains the treaty-
making power quite as much as any other. If it did not, and
any treaty entered into in due form was in itself necessarily
supreme law, a State might possibly by the force of it be set
off from the Union to another nation, or the government might
1Hamilton's Works, Vol. IV, p. 342.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Annu. Rep. A.B.A. 250 1893
ITENRY WADE ROGERS.
gradually and imperceptibly be overturned through a, line of
precedents constituting what at the time were perhaps not seen
to be encroachments."'
We think it is fair to say that the treaty-making power is
limited by all the provisions of the Constitution which prohibit
certain acts from being done by the government. The treaty-
making power cannot be used, for instance, to establish slavery
or involuntary servitude, or to take from any class of persons,
born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
their right of citizenship, or to assume a debt incurred in aid
of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or to
establish a national religion, or to abridge the freedom of
speech or of the press, or to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
there being no rebellion or invasion, or to take away the trial
by jury, or to deprive a State of its equal representation with
others in the Senate. It is also limited by provisions of the
Constitution which direct certain acts to be done in a par-
ticular way. The treaty-making power, for example, cannot
be used to provide that the President shall be elected in a way
different from that mentioned in the Constitution, or that the
Justices of the Supreme Court shall hold their offices for :a
term of years and be elected by the people. This power cannot
be used to change in any way the character of the government,
or to do that which is inconsistent with its nature and structure.:'
A treaty which should invade in any way the reserved rights
of the States would be unconstitutional. It must be evident
that unless there are constitutional limitations on the treat)-
making power, Congress might practically cease to be the law-
making body as prescribed by the Constitution. 'T'he treaty-
making power could lay and collect taxes, regulate commerce,
establish rules of naturalization, of patents and copyrights,
define and punish piracies, borrow money, regulate the value
of coin, fix a standard of weights and measures, make rules
'The Forum, June, 1893, pp. 397, 398.
2 See Calhoun's Works, Vol. 1, p. 201.
'See Prevost vs. Greneaux, 19 How. 7.
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and regulations governing the army and navy, admit new
States into the Union, and, in fact, exercise most of the powers
of government now entrusted to Congress.
That the treaty-making power extends to the annexation
of territory is now conceded, although, as we all know,
Mr. Jefferson did not believe that he had constitutional
authority to make the treaty of 1803 with France for the
cession of Louisiana to the United States. That treaty was
concluded April 30th, and in August Mr. Jefferson wrote
as follows
"But I suppose they (Congress) must than appeal to the
nation for an additional article to the Constitution, approving
or confirming an act which the nation had not previously
authorized. * * * The Executive in seizing the fugitive
occurence, which so much advances the good of their country,
have done an act beyond the Constitution." 1
Mr. Jefferson was not mistaken in thinking that the treaty-
making power was subject to limitations, although, of course,
mistaken in believing that it did not extend to the acquisition
of foreign territory. No amendment of the Constitution was
needed to support the treaty. In 1828, Chief Justice Marshall
thus summarily disposed of the point:
"The Constitution confers absolutely on the government of
the Union, the ' powers of making war, and of making treaties;'
consequently that government possesses the power of acquiring
territory either by conquest or by treaty. '"2
But while the treaty-making power thus extends to the
acquisition of foreign territory, the question arises whether
there are not implied limitations respecting it ? Can it be
possible that the President and the Senate have the power to
annex the countries of Asia. or of Africa, and make them a
part of the American Union ? At this very time the importance
of annexing the Hawaiian Islands is being urged upon the
attention of the people of the United States. Can the treaty-
I Jefterson's Works, Vol. IV, page 500; and see Ibid, page 505.
2 Am. Ins. Co. v.3. Canter, I Peters, 511, 542.
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making power of the government be properly used to create
a system of American colonies in distant quarters of the globe,
such as England, Germany, and France have established?
One of the most distinguished jurists which this country has
produced has expressed the opinion that while it might not be
possible to annul a treaty to that effect once made, it would
nevertheless be usurpation to make it.' The Union was estab-
lished and the Constitution adopted for "the United States
of America." What right has the treaty-making power to
enlarge it to the United States of America, Europe, Asia, and
Africa? We think it has none whatever. Mr. Webster
declared in 1837 that he did not believe the framers of the Con-
stitution contemplated the annexation of foreign territory2
But, whatever view may be taken of the constitutional question
involved, it would seem as a matter of policy to be unwise to
annex territory not contiguous to our own. In 1809, Jefferson
wrote to Madison "Nothing should ever be accepted which
would require a navy to defend it."
The annexation of territory may fall more appropriately
within the province of the law-making than the treaty-making
power. The Constitution of the United States provides that
new States may be admitted by the Congress into the Union.
To provide by treaty that a territory annexed shall be admitted
as a State into the Union is to ignore the rights of the House
and is a usurpation of power. The annexation of Texas to
the United States was not accomplished under the treaty-
making power, but by congressional action. Mr. Calhoun, as
Secretary of State in Mr. Tyler's cabinet, had negotiated a
treaty for its annexation, but the treaty failed of ratification
by the Senate. As soon as the treaty was rejected, Mr. Tyler
sent a message to Congress suggesting that that body provide
for annexation by law or joint resolution. A joint resolution
passed both houses in accordance with which annexation was
See Judge Cooley's article on "Grave Obstacles to Hawaiian Annex-
ation," 'oruLm, June, 1893.
2 Webster's Works, Vol. 1, p. 357.
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secured. A writer on the "Constitutional History of the United
States," who is also a biographer of Mr. Calhoun, asserts in his
life of the latter that the action of the President was in fact
an appeal from the Senate, which had the unquestionable right
to reject a treaty, to the House of Representatives, to which
no power had been given by the Constitution in relation to
treaties. Professor Von Holst asks: "What was the sense
of rendering the consent of two-thirds of the Senate indispensa-
ble for the conclusion of every treaty if, after a treaty bad been
rejected by the Senate, a simple majority of both Houses of
Congress had the right virtually to ratify it, by accomplishing
in some other form what the treaty was to have accomplished ?
The answer is that it was within the constitutional power of
Congress to do exactly what was done, and that as the intention
of the friends of annexation was, all along, the admission of
Texas into the Union as a State, what was done was done not
only constitutionally, but in the most appropriate way, as it
allowed the House to be consulted in the first instance in the
matter of the admission of a new State into the Union. Pro-
fessor Von Holst's question may be followed by another: What
reason is there for ignoring the House of Representatives in a
matter of annexation, the purpose being to bring a new State
into the Union, when the fundamental law provides that new
States may be admitted into the Union by the Congress ?
In the Treaty of' 1819 with Spain, ceding Florida to the
United States, the following provision was inserted:
" The inhabitants of the territories which His Catholic
Majesty cedes to the United States, by this treaty, shall be
incorporated in the Union of the United States, as soon as may
be consistent with the principles of the Federal Constitution,
and admitted to the enjoyment of all the privileges, rights, and
immunities of the citizens of the United States."
A foreign State cannot be made a member of the Union by
the treaty-making power. An Act of Congress is essential.
Assuming that the treaty-making power agrees that a foreign
State shall be admitted as a State, the question arises whether
HeinOnline  -- 16 Annu. Rep. A.B.A. 254 1893
HENRY WADE ROGERS.
it becomes the constitutional duty of the House to enact the
necessary legislation. This question is answered in another
part of this paper.
The treaty-making power may also be subject to limitations
as respects the cession of territory. In England, under the
British Constitution, the extent of the power has been dis-
cussed recently and with much vehemence. Various limita-
tions have been alleged respecting the right of the Crown to
cede territory by treaty. It is said that the sovereign may
cede territories acquired by conquest, and Crown colonies, but
that the power does not extend to the cession of other territory,
or any territory respecting which Parliament has legislated.
It is claimed that the powers of cession at the end of a war are
different from and larger than those existing in times of peace.'
There seems to be, however, no authority beyond the dicta
expressed in Parliamentary debate, or otherwise, for any such
limitations on the treaty-maling power in Great Britain. The
extent of the power in the United States has been a vexed
question. Mr. Jefferson advised Washington that the power
did not extend to the alienation of territory. His opinion was
" that by the law of nations it was settled that the unity and
indivisibility of the society was so fundamental that it could
not be dismembered by the constituted authorities, except (1),
when all power was delegated to them (as in the case of des-
potic governments), or (2), when it was expressly delegated;
that neither of these delegations had been made to our general
government, and, therefore, that it had no right to dismember
or alienate any portion of territory once ultimately consolidated
with us.' '1 Jefferson represents Hamilton as agreeing with him
as to the law of nations, and as thinking that no cession of
settled territory involving a loss of citizenship could be made
without the consent of the inhabitants affected. Wheaton
expresses a doubt as to how far a mere general treaty-making
power vested in the head of a federal government such as ours
'Anson's Law and Custom of Parliament, Pt. II, p. 280.
2Jefferson's Works, Vol. IX, p. 137.
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necessarily carries with it the power of alienating the territory
of any member of the Union without its consent.' In the settle-
ment of the disputed north-eastern boundary between Great
Britain and the United States, which involved the cession of
territory in which the States of Maine and Massachusetts were
intrusted, this country before ratifying the Ashburton Treaty
of 1842 was careful to obtain the consent of the States named
to the cession contemplated. This, of course, is not conclusive
on the question of constitutional power, but it clearly shows
that a strong doubt was entertained respecting it.
The Constitution gives to Congress the power to fix duties
and regulate commerce. It also provides that all bills for
raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representa-
tives. If the treaty-making power includes the right to make
commercial treaties, it may fix duties, regulate commerce, and
raise revenue without any consultation with the House of
Representatives. This question came before the Senate in
1844 in connection with the ratification of a commercial
treaty with the German States, which had been negotiated by
Mr. Wheaton. The treaty was not ratified in the Senate
because of paramount constitutional objections. Mr. Choate,
of Massachusetts, made an adverse report for the Committee
on Foreign Relations. Among other things the report says:
"In the judgment of the committee, the Legislature is the
department of government by which commerce should be regu-
lated and laws of revenue passed. The Constitution in terms
communicates the power to regulate commerce and to impose
duties to that department. It communicates it in terms to no
other. Without engaging at all in an examination of the
extent, limits, and objects of the power to make treaties, the
committee believe that the general rule of the system is, indis-
putably, that the control of trade and the function of taxing
belong, without abridgment or participation, to Congress."
The matter again came before the Senate in 1848 at the
request of the President for its further consideration. On this
'Dana's Wheaton on International Law, 543.
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occasion the vote against ratification was unanimous, and the
defeat was due to the constitutional objections previously
referred to. In a discussion which occurred in the Senate in
1885 over the ratification of proposed reciprocity treaties with
Spain, Nicaragua, and Mexico, Mr. Morrill, of Vermont, in
urging these constitutional objections quoted Mr. Webster as
having said, " I hope I know the Constitution of my country
better than to think a reciprocity treaty is constitutional."
The Senator from Vermont went on to say :
The powers separately and specially granted by the Con-
stitution to one branch of our Government cannot be assumed
or held in common by any other branch at its pleasure.
'['he invasion of the jurisdiction of one by another cannot be
accounted less than rank usurpation. * * * It appears to
me, therefore, that any treaty which encroaches upon the power
to regulate commerce or upon that to originate revenue
bills involves a plain, open, and palpable violation of the
Constitution."
It would seem that tjhe objections thus urged against com-
mercial treaties are valid reasons against such an exercise of
the treaty-making power. But if this be so we must admit, as.
Mr. Calhoun said in 1844. that its exercise has been one con-
tinued series of habitual and interrupted infringements of the-
Constitution, as from the beginning it has been exercised cen-
stantly on commerce. The practice is, however, to include in
all such treaties a stipulation that they shall not be operative-
until Congress shall have enacted the legislation necessary to,
carry them into effect. President Arthur, in his message to
Congress of 1884, calls attention to the fact that such a pro-
vision was contained in the commercial treaties negotiated by
him, and that it was " deemed to be requisite under the clause
of the Constitution limiting to the House of Representatives
the authority to originate bills for raising revenue."
While the Constitution confines the treaty-making power to
the President and the Senate, there are those who have claimed
that the House of Representatives is entitled to exercise a veto
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power on the making of treaties by declining to pass laws
which may be necessary to carry the treaty into effect. This
question was first raised in 1796 in connection with the Jay
treaty, and gave rise to decided differences of opinion, which
continue to exist. The House declared by resolution at that
time that when a treaty stipulates regulations on any of the
subjects submitted by the Constitution to the power of Con-
gress, it must depend for its execution as to such stipulations
on a law or laws to be passed by Congress, and that it is the
constitutional right and duty of the House in all such cases to
deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying the
treaty into effect. This view was shared by Jefferson and
' 'adison. President Washington took a different view of the
matter. The question was raised again in 1803 in connection
with an appropriation for the purchase of Louisiana, and in
1868, when a like appropriation was desired for the purchase
of Alaska, and later in connection with an award to England
by the Commission on the Fisheries. The House, while
insisting on its constitutional right to pass the act or refuse it,
according to its own judgment, whether a treaty should go into
effect or not, has in no instance refused to enact whatever law
was needed to give effect to a treaty entered into by the Presi-
dent and Senate. It is claimed, on the one hand, that a treaty
made by the President and Senate is the supreme law of the
land, and as obligatory on the House of Representatives as
upon any of the departments of government: that if the treaty
contains a promise of a money payment it creates a public debt
in respect to which the House has no more discretion than it
has over the payment of the bonds for the public debt: that the
House has the power to decline to make the necessary appro-
priation, but in so doing it violates the public faith as much in
the one case as in the other. But, on the other hand, it is
argued that a treaty is only the supreme law of the land in
cases where it can go into effect without legislative aid : that in
cases where the concurrence of the House is necessary to give
it effect, as when an appropriation of money is needed, the
treaty is not perfect until that concurrence is obtained.
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It would seem the better opinion that in all ordinary cases
the House should not hesitate to enact the necessary legislation
to give effect to a treaty solemnly entered into with a foreign
power. That power has nothing to do with the auxiliary legis-
lative measures necessary to be taken on our part to give effect
to the treaty. The United States is responsible for the execu-
tion of its treaties, and is not less responsible because a breach
of faith arises out of " the discordant action of the internal
machinery of its Constitution." A treaty with France in
1831 provided for the payment by that country of indemnities
for spoliations on American commerce, and the French Cham-
bers refused to vote the money. Thereupon President Jackson
sent a message to Congress recommending immediate reprisals
unless provision should be made for the payment of the debt
at the next session of the French Chambers. Under like cir-
cumstances we should probably receive like treatment. At the
same time it seems the better opinion that the House has a
constitutional right to exercise an independent* judgment in
cases where legislation is necessary because of constitutional
limitations on the treaty-making power. That- power, for
instance, cannot appropriate money, and cannot admit new
States into the Union. In such cases the House cannot be
deprived of its constitutional rights by virtue of any treaty
stipulations.
The Congress of the United States in enacting laws is sub-
ject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, and the
judiciary bold an act of Congress void if passed in violation
of the fundamental law. The great case of Marbury vs. Mad-
ison, I Craneb 137, decided in 1803, settled that question for
all time. But does any distinction in this respect exist between
the law-making and the treaty-making power, or will the courts
also hold that a treaty, made by the President and confirmed
by the Senate, is void, if, in their judgment, it violates in some
way the fundamental law ? It has been claimed that a dis-
tinction exists between these two cases, and that the courts
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have Po right to hold a treaty void on constitutional grounds.'
The sixth article of the Constitution reads as follows :
" This Constitution and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the land."
It is claimed that while a law is void if not made "in pur-
suance " of the Constitution, yet a treaty is "the supreme
law of the land" if only it has been made under the authority
of the United States. And it is said to be a necessary prin-
ciple in all governments that treaties made by the treaty-
making power in good faith must be considered as of para-
mount obligation, and that they bind the contracting parties
according to the laws and usages of nations without reference
to the fundamental law or municipal regulations of either. If
in pronouncing a treaty void we say to the foreign power
that it is bound to take notice of our Constitution, and to
know that under its provisions no authority exists for the
treaty in question, the other power may very properly reply to
its that it should not be required to know a matter of our own
law about which we ourselves appeared to be ignorant It is
curious that such a question as this should be raised in this
country. It is clear, as before stated, that the courts of the
United States can pronounce an act of Congress void. It is
also well known that the courts of Great Britain cannot pro-
nounce an act of Parliament void. The courts of Great
Britain do not hesitate, however, to hold that the Crown has
exceeded its jurisdiction in its treaty engagements, and they
hold such engagements unconstitutional and void. In a case
before Sir Robert Phillimore, in 1879, the question was con-
sidered whether the Crown could by treaty merely extend to
foreigners immunities from the law of the land so as to affect
the private rights of citizens. He held that this could not be
done, saying: " This is a use of the treaty-making preroga-
tive of the Crown which I believe to be without precedent,
'See the Jurist, Vol. XI, p. 305, (1834).
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and in principle contrary to the laws of the Constitution."
Lie, therefore, declined to give effect to the treaty.' The case
was overruled in the court above. but on another point. Can
it be within the power of the English courts to pronounce a
treaty agreement void as being repugnant to the British Con-
stitution, but beyond the power of our courts to render a sim-
ilar decision respecting a treaty repugnant to the Constitution
of the United States? In a case before the Supreme Court of
the United States in 1796, it was argued by counsel that,
under the Articles of Confederation, Congress did not have the
power to make certain stipulations contained in the Treaty of
Peace with Great Britain. In announcing his opinion, Mr.
Justice Chase referred to the matter in the following guarded
language:
The argument, that Congress had not power to make the
4th Article of the treaty of peace, if its intent and operation
was to annul the laws of any of the States, and to destroy
vested rights was unnecessary. but on the supposition that this
Court possesses a power to decide whether this article of the
treaty is within the authority delegated to that -body, by the
Articles of Confederation. Whether this Court constitutionall v
possess such a power is not necessary now to determine,
because I am fully satisfied that Congress were invested with
the authority to make the stipulation in the 4th Article. If
the Court possess a power to declare treaties void, I shall
never exercise it, but in a very clear case indeed."-
A doubt seems to be intimated in the language quoted as to
the power of the Court to hold a treaty void. But it must be
remembered that it the time this language was used doubt
existed as to whether the Cburts could hold an act of Congress
void. From what has previously been said, it appears that the
treaty-making power is subject to limitation, and to assume
that it cannot be confined within its limitation is contrary
to our theory of government. If our Courts have never
"[he Parlement Beige, L. R., 4 P. D., 154.
2 Ware vs. Hylton, 3 Dallas 199, 237.
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decided that the right exists in the judiciary to hold a treaty
void on constitutional grounds it is because the occasion for
such a decision has not yet arisen. It is not possible that the
Courts of the United States will enforce a treaty made in
violation of the fundamental law. The judicial power of the
Federal Courts extends to cases arising under treaties and as
a treaty is the law of the land only when it is made "under
the authority of the United States," the Courts must have the
right to decid6 whether it has been so made, and it is certain
that it has not been so made if it contravenes the fundamental
law. Neither the treaty-making nor the law-making power has
any" authority " to violate constitutional provisions.
Important differences exist between the treaty-making power
in Great Britain and the United States. In the former, as
before remarked, the power is lodged in the Executive alone,
while in the latter it is lodged in the Executive and Senate
jointly. In the former, a treaty is a contract merely; in the
latter it is a law. A treaty everywhere binds the contracting
parties according to the laws and usages of nations, but in the
United States that which is elsewhere a contract is by the
fundamental law raised to the dignity of a 'supreme law of
the land." In Great Britain a treaty made by the Crown
which is contrary to an act of Parliament would not be enforced
by the courts of that country. But in the United States a
treaty made by the President and confirmed by the Senate will
be enforced by our courts and construed as repealing any pro-
vision contrary thereto which may be found in the Constitution
or laws of any of the States, or in any act of Congress pre-
viously passed. In Great Britain, treaties of commerce, for
example, fixing the amount of dhties to be charged on the
exportation or importation of goods cannot become operative
without the aid of an act of Parliament. While in the United
States a similar treaty, if such a treaty can be constitutionally
made, as claimed by many, would not require an act of Con-
gress to give it effect, but would itself operate as a law repeal-
ing all prior laws repugnant thereto.
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Statutes and treaties are alike laws, but the methods by
which they become such are radically different. The law-
making body takes the initiative in the enactment of statutes,
while the Executive takes the initiative in the making of
treaties. In the enactment of statutes it is necessary to have
the assent of the House as well as the Senate, but in the mak-
ing of treaties the House need not be consulted. Publicity
attends the enactment of a statute through all its stages from
its introduction as a bill to the final vote on its passage, but
secrecy characterizes the making of a treaty from the begin-
ning of negotiation to final confirmation by the Senate.
The secrecy with which the foreign affairs of the government
are conducted is in striking contrast with the publicity which
attends the administration of other affairs of government. Our
laws are openly made in our legislative assemblies, and publicly
administered in our courts. But when it comes to the making
of treaties the people are not informed of the action contem-
plated until after it has been taken. The question, therefore,
naturally arises as to the reason for the making of a treaty in
secret while a statute is made with entire publicity. And the
question acquires additional significance when we reflect that
the law which is publicly made in our Congress can be easily
unmade in the next if the people disapprove it, while the treaty
which is secretly made, being a solemn contract with a foreign
power, can only be set aside by mutual consent of the two gov-
ernments concerned. In the United States we claim to have
a government of the people, for the people, and by the people,
and yet without the knowledge of the people the most solemn
obligations are assumed which must be fulfilled as promised
unless we are prepared to break the national faith and enter,
perhaps, on war.
Recent events press on the public mind the question of the
propriety of keeping a treaty under the seal of secrecy until
it is ratified and published. I raise no question here as to the
wisdom and justice displayed by this government in the treaty
said to have been entered into with Russia for the extradition
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of fugitives from justice. I think that a strong argument may
be made in favor of the treaty, but the fact remains that since
its reported ratification it has been received in this country
with pronounced disapproval. The American Law Review
declares that " the public opinion of the American people is
unanimously against it," and it calls for the abrogation of the
custom of considering in "executive session of the Senate the
ratification of treaties, declaring that there " is absolutely no
excuse for this seal of official secrecy." It expresses the
opinion that " if Senators spoke and voted in the public hearing
and in the public view, such a treaty as this could never be
ratified." There are strong reasons which favor considering
in open session the proposed ratification of treaties. -But it is
not clear that the reasons for making such a departure from
accustomed usage are sufficiently strong to warrant its adop-
tion. One of' the reasons for excluding the House of Repre-
sentatives from any share in the treaty-making power was the
supposed necessity of secrecy in such matters, and the impossi-
bility of maintaining secrecy if a body so numerous as the
House were to be permitted to participate in the exercise of
the power. Washington, in his Message to the House, dated
March 30th. 1796, declining to commmunicate to that body
instructions given to the minister of the United States at the
Court of St. James, and the correspondence and documents
relating to the Jay treaty, all of which had been called for by
a resolution of the House, emphasized the importance of
observing secrecy in the making of treaties. " The nature of
foreign negotiations," he says, "requires caution, and their
success must often depend on secrecy; and even when brought
to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands,
or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or
contemplated, would be extremely impolitic; for this might have
a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce
immediate inconvenience, perhaps danger and mischief, in
relation to other powers. The necessity of such caution and
secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making
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treaties in the ]'resident, with the advice and consent of the
Senate ; the principle on which that body was formed con-
fining it to a small body of members." Jay, in the Federalist,
also attaches importance to the element of secrecy. "It
seldom happens," he says, "in the negotiation of treaties, of
whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate dis-
patch are sometimes necessary." 
[n this, [Hamilton also concurred.2 It may be said that
secrecy may be important in the negotiation of the treaty, but
that it ceases to be of importance by the time it reaches the
Senate for confirmation. This, however, is not the case, as
the Senate may desire the modification of the treaty, making
further negotiations necessary. If secrecy is important at all,
its importance continues until final ratification is accomplished.
There are certain principles which the treaty-making power
may well observe in entering into treaty engagements.
1. The fewer treaties there are between nations the better
for the interests of peace. The policy of the United States, as
outlined by Mr. Jefferson,was to avoid as far as possible enter-
ing into treaty relation with foreign powers. In 1804, he
he wrote as follows regarding a proposal to enter into a treaty
with Naples:
" On the subject of treaties, our system is to have none with
any nation, as far as can be avoided. We believe that, with
nations. as with individuals, dealings may be carried bn as
advantageously, perhaps more so, while their continuance
depends on a voluntary good treatment, as if fixed by a con-
tract, which, when it becomes injurious to either, is made by
forced constructions, to mean what suits them, and becomes a
cause of war instead of a bond of peace. * * * it is
against our system to embarrass ourselves with treaties."
There is a great deal of political wisdom in one of Cobden's
maxims, "The greatest possible contact between peoples," he
said, "and the least possible contact between governments;
'The Federali.it, Number 64.
"The Federalis t, Number 75.
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because the contact of peoples promotes peace, and the contact
of governments endangers peace." The governments of the
world are realizing this, and careful examination will show
that, as compared with former times, fewer treaties are nego-
tiated between States.
2. As a rule, treaties should be made for a limited period
and with provisions for revisal at stated times. There are some
treaties which from their nature must be permanent, as treaties
of boundary, of cession or exchange of territory. But the
practice sometimes indulged of entering into " perpetual and
eternal" engagements between nations respecting matters
where permanence is not made essential by the nature of the
treaty, can hardly be too severely condemned. Such engage-
ments have, with reason, been pronounced "preposterous."
John Stuart Mill argues strongly against this practice.
I am not aware of "any good reason why engagements
reciprocally entered into between nations for their joint advan-
tage should not be subject to periodical renewal. There are
few, if any, contracts between nations the terms of which
might not be so framed as to protect either party from sustain-
ing undue loss or injury in case of the non-renewal of the
contract."' In his opinion, nations cannot rightfully bind
themselves or others beyond the period to which human fore-
sight can be presumed to extend. To undertake more is to
incur the danger that the fulfillment of the obligation may, by
change of circumstances, become either wrong or unwise. In
the "instructions " issued to our Ministers Plenipotentiary
appointed to negotiate treaties of commerce with European
nations, bearing date May 7th, 1784, our government directed
that such treaties should be made for a term not exceeding ten
years friom the exchange of ratification, with liberty "to
extend the same as far as fifteen years with any nation which
may pertinaciously insist thereon." This has been the policy
of the United Staites, in the main, from that time to this. To
be sure,we have sometimes promised to maintain a perpetual
'Mill's Works, Vol. V, p. 138.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Annu. Rep. A.B.A. 266 1893
HENRY WADE ROGERS.
peace, as in the treaty of 1833 with Muscat, in which it is
agreed that " There shall be a perpetual peace between the
United States of America and Seyed Syeed Bin, Sultan, and
his dependencies." But there are few such foolish statements
to be found in the treaties of the United States. Certainly,
agreements for perpetual peace can do no harm. But ordi-
narily, instead of entering into a perpetual engagement, it is
fiar more sensible to provide, as in the treaty with Great
Britain of 1862 , that "It (the treaty) shall continue and
remain in full force for the term of ten years from the day of
exchange of the ratifications, .und further, until the end of one
year after either of the contracting parties shall have given
notice to the other of his intention to terminate the same, each
of the contracting parties reserving to itself the right of giving
such notice to the other at the end of said term of ten years."
Or, as it is expressed in the treaty of 1842 with the same
country, where it is provided:
" The eighth article of this treaty shall be in force for five
years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications, and
afterwards until one or the other party shall signify a wish to
terminate it."
Treaties are permanently obeyed only when they represent
the continued wishes of the parties.
3. Nations should as seldom as possible put oppressive or
humiliating conditions into treaties. That is excellent advice
which Immanuel Kant gives in his Essay on Perpetual Peace,
where he says that 1' at the end of a war we should not make
treaties which contain the seeds of another war." It is not
safe or prudent to proceed.on the theory that the terms of a
treaty are to be regulated solely by the interests and relative
strength at the time of the victors and vanquished.
Conditions should not be imposed which cannot reas)nably
be expected to be kept. Restrictions, for example, on the
power of a nation to manage its own affairs, or which deprive
it of rights common to all nations, are not likely to be per-
manently submitted to. A coming generation cannot be justly
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asked to submit to a penalty imposed for offenses committed
by a generation which preceded it.
4. When it is necessary to have legislation supplementary
to a treaty, as when an appropriation of money is needed, the
treaty should expressly provide that it is not to go into effect
until a law to carry it into operation shall have passed the legisla-
tive body. "But prudence will point out," so Jefferson wrote
in 1792, "this difference to be attended to in making them
(treaties), viz: when a treaty contains such articles as will go
into execution of themselves, or be carried into execution by
the judges, they may be safely made; but when there are
articles which require a law to be passed afterwards by the
legislature, great caution is requisite."
5. There should be introduced into treaties a clause making
provision for the arbitration of disputed questions arising in
regard to the matters to which the treaty relates. In the case
of ordinary contracts between individuals when differences of
opinion arise as to the meaning of the contract and the nature
of the obligations assumed, a resort may be had to the judicial
tribunals which have authority to determine whether a breach
of the contract has been committed, and either compel a
specific performance or award damages to the injured party.
But in contracts between nations, in the absence of some such
provision as that contended for, there is, unfortunately, no
tribunal which has the right or power to decide such disputes
and bitter controversies interrupting friendly relations,
embittering the peoples of the two countries, and finally resulting
in war are not infrequently the result. In the treaty of 1854
extending the right of fishing and regulating commerce and
navigation between the United States and the British possessions
in North America, provision was wisely made to prevent or
settle disputes arising as to certain matters under the treaty.
That treaty provides that " in order to prevent or settle" any
dispute concerning certain questions that were liable to arise
under the treaty, each of the high contracting parties, on the
application of either to the other, shall within six months there-
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after, appoint a Commission ; that the Commissioners, before
proceeding to any business, shall make and subscribe a solemn
declaration that they will decide according to justice and equity,
Cc without fear, favor, or affection to their own country.'* The
Commissioners are to name some third person as arbitrator in
cases on which they differ in opinion, and if they cannot agree
on the name of such third person, they are each to name a
person, and it is then to be determined by lot which of the two
persons so named is to be the arbitrator; and both of the con-
tracting parties solemnly engage to consider the decision of the
Commissioners, or of the arbitrator as the case may be, final and
conclusive of the matter in dispute. The wonder is that similar
provisions are not more frequently incorporated into treaties.
The want of such a tribunal has been often felt and keenly
deplored. Lord Derby, in 1877, while Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, attending to the absence of such a tribunal for the
settlement of such questions when they arise between nations,
said:
" Unhappily, there is no international tribunal to which cases
of this kind can be referred, or there is no international law
by which parties can be required to refer cases of this kind.
If such a tribunal existed it would be a great benefit to the
civilized world."
The Association for the Reform and Codification of the
Law of Nations have advocated the making of provision in
treaties for the settlement by arbitration of disputed questions
thus arising.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Annu. Rep. A.B.A. 269 1893
